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a b s t r a c t
Wegenerate observable expectations about ﬁscal variables through laboratory experiments
using real world data from several European countries as stimuli.We compare a VARmodel
of expectations for data that is presented in a ﬁscal frame with one for neutrally presented
data. We test the validity of the setup and ﬁnd that participants understand the meaning of
the ﬁscal variables, but also that their ability to perceive the correct characteristics of ﬁscal
policy is limited. Expectations are consistent neither with rational nor with purely adaptive
expectations, but instead follow an augmented-adaptive scheme.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Expectations on ﬁscal variables are crucial to understand the effect of ﬁscal policy on the private sector. Little, however,
is known about the way people actually form expectations on ﬁscal variables. While many models are based on the hypoth-
esis of rational expectations, expectations themselves are not easily observable. As a result, empirical tests of the rational
expectations hypothesis are often indirect, involving tests of predicted relations between observables, such as relationships
between ﬁscal variables and components of output.
A problem in this approach is that factors that are not part of the model may affect expectations and choices in real
economies. This makes the identiﬁcation of the effects of expectations difﬁcult because “economists cannot observe all the
data that economic agents do” (Seater, 1993, p. 164).
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This limitation is also relevant for expectation measures derived from opinion surveys.1 Moreover surveys suffer from
lack of economic incentives to reveal true opinions, so that for various reasons respondents “may express judgments that
are different from the ones they choose to act upon” (Pesaran, 1987, p. 209).
An alternative is to measure expectations in a controlled experiment. Expectations experiments have been conducted
since as early as the sixties in a wide range of economic contexts.2 Many of these experiments ask participants to form
expectations for artiﬁcial time series that are based on an abstract model. The advantage of using artiﬁcial time series is that
the data generating process is known to the experimenter and can immediately be used as a benchmark. It is possible to
ﬁnd out in a straightforward way under which conditions participants form which kinds of expectations for a given abstract
model. This convenience comes at a cost: within this framework one can study expectations only for the given abstract
model. First, one has to assume that participants in an experiment understand the formal description of the abstract model,
and second, one has to assume that decision makers use similar procedures when they form expectations for different, and
not perfectly known, processes in the real world. To bridge the gap between abstract games in the laboratory and economic
reality, experimenters can calibrate a speciﬁc model with parameters from the real world. Experiments on tax compliance
(Alm and McKee, 2004) or on decisions over monetary policy (Lombardelli et al., 2002; Blinder and Morgan, 2005) follow
this approach.
In this paper we present a laboratory experiment that is not based on an abstract model with parameters from the real
world but on real time series. Compared with experiments where participants forecast abstract time series, the use of real
world time series has advantages and disadvantages. An advantage is that we can observe expectations in an economic
context with real economic data. If the process of expectation formation depends on the economic context or on the type
of the data, then the expectations we can measure are closer to the ones that are relevant for real economic decisions. A
disadvantage is that with real world time series, it is no longer obvious what rational expectations are. We no longer have
the clean benchmark abstract time series would provide. Instead, we have to construct a benchmark with the help of an
econometric model. To do that, we follow a standard approach and assume that the DGP can be described as a VAR. The
estimated VAR of the ﬁeld data will constitute our benchmark solution.
We use annual time series on taxes and public expenditures from 15 OECD countries. Given the novelty of the approach
we carefully check the internal validity of the experiment. We also study the impact of learning, fatigue, gender, and ﬁeld of
study of the participants.
To understand and to structure the expectation formation process better we assume that the joint DGP of stimuli and
expectations data can be described as a VAR.Weﬁnd that participants fail to perceive the ﬁscal properties from the ﬁeld, thus
violating the ‘rational expectation hypothesis’. Expectations are rather in linewith ‘augmented-adaptivemodels’, introduced
in the early eighties by various authors (see Pesaran).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of the experiment. Section 3 provides descriptive statistics
of the results and discusses internal validity. Section 4.1 develops the econometric approach to analyse both the stimulus and
the expectations data. Inference results are presented in Section 4.2. The last section summarises the external signiﬁcance
of the approach and of the ﬁndings.
2. Experimental setup
In the experiment participants are exposed to graphic representations of time series of annual ﬁscal variables taken from
various European countries. Time is denoted t, stimuli are gross total taxes Tt, total public expenditure Gt (including interest
payments), public debt Bt, and change in the debt level Bt =Bt −Bt−1, all expressed as yearly percentage of GDP. We focus
on the relationship between taxes and expenditure, denoted by the vector xt: = (Tt, Gt)′. Here and in the following  is the
time difference.
Participants know that they are facing European countries, but they do not know which speciﬁc country and which
period the series refer to. Participants are paid in each period according to the precision of their expectations. The better
their expectations, the higher is their income. The payment scheme can be motivated as a utility that a hypothetical agent
derives from consumption over the current and the previous period if this agent uses the expectations of our participant and
maximises the utility function:
ut =
t∏
i=t−1
(
3
4
Ci +
1
4
Gi
)
(1)
1 For example, surveys conducted by Grun (1991) and Allers et al. (1998) found widespread evidence of misinformation on the conduct of government
ﬁscal policy.
2 Such experiments include expectations for prices (Fisher, 1962; Schmalensee, 1976), expectations about artiﬁcially constructed time series (Hey, 1994),
expectations in normal-form games (e.g. Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2001), about the provision of public-goods (Offerman et al., 1996; Croson, 2000),
expectations in the cobweb economy (Hommes et al., 2007), on monetary policies (e.g. Marimon and Sunder, 1993; Bernasconi and Kirchkamp, 2000) or
even ﬁscal policy (Swenson, 1997).
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Fig. 1. Tt and Gt treatment. Values are given as percentage of GDP. Gray lines indicate past, black lines indicate recent years.
subject to the budget constraint:
t∑
i=t−1
(1 − Ci − Ti)︸ ︷︷ ︸
savings
· (1 + r)i = 0 with r = 0.1 (2)
(where 1 is the normalised total GDP). Agents receive initial information on the ﬁrst seven values of stimuli, which, for
most countries, was the period from 1970 to 1976. Let t−1 be the last available year and Xt−1: = (x1, . . ., xt−1)′ the available
information; then forecasts are made repeatedly for each subsequent year t until the end of the time series is reached in
1998. Participants would then start with another, randomly selected country.
We compare three experimental treatments. In a baseline treatment participants forecast both Tt and Gt (see Fig. 1).
Forecasts for the next period are made by clicking with the mouse directly into the diagrams.
To control whether participants understand the economic context of the baseline treatment we also run a treatment
where this context is removed. The time series are the same as in the baseline treatment, but variables have no economic
signiﬁcance. They are simply called A, B, and C. We call this treatment the ‘neutral’ treatment.
A main aspect of this paper is to study how participants use information about one variable (e.g. Tt) to forecast another
(e.g. Gt). A natural implementation would be to present two variables Tt and Gt and to ask participants to forecast both. This
is what we do in the above two treatments. To check whether such a simultaneous forecast is too difﬁcult, we also run a
control treatment where participants forecast Tt only.3
Forecasts are called TEit and G
Ei
t , where i indicates agent i and E stands for expectation. The forecasts of agent i that refer
to time t are denoted yi,t = (TEit , GEit )′ in the Tt and Gt treatment and yi,t:=TEit in the Tt only treatment.
The time series of the stimuli (see Fig. 1) are updated every period after forecasts are made, so subjects learn about
realizations of the stimuli as the economy moves on. Participants also get feedback about their wage, which reﬂects the
accuracy of their forecast.4
Openly providing all payoff relevant information in economic experiments is standard and essential. Hence, we explain
in the instructions (see Appendix) the above payment scheme in details with examples and also with a short technical note.
Subjects were not obliged to look at the technical note, but were told that they could consult it and check everything if they
wished to control the experimenter.
Stimulus data were from 15 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and UK.5 For the majority of countries the sample period of stimulus
data was 1970–1998; a few exceptions (Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, and UK) are due to limits in the availability of the
3 In all three treatments subjects had information for past taxes and public expenditure. The display for the Tt only treatment was similar to that of the
Tt and Gt treatment in Fig. 1, with the only difference that the values of taxes and public expenditure were both displayed on the y-axis, with the period of
the observations (not the year, which remained unknown to subjects) on the x-axis.
4 To reward participants, the computer constructs the optimal consumption level Ct−1 based on a subjects’ forecasts yi,t for year t and given Eqs. (1)
and (2). When in the next period xt: = (Tt , Gt)′ becomes available, we use Eqs. (2) and (1) to calculate Ct and the utility ut . The participant’s per minute
wage is w = 0.66 × (ut/u∗t )
 where =12,000 in the Tt and Gt treatment and 15,000 in the Tt only treatment. u∗t is the utility the participant would obtain
with forecasting the true values. This transformation from utilities into wages is monotonic and, hence, does not affect the maximisation problem of the
individual, but creates steeper incentives to make good forecasts. Participants are paid this wage up to 2min for each forecast. Parameters of the payment
scheme have been developed in pilot studies previous to the experiment.
5 All stimulus data used in the experiment were taken from the database “Fiscal Positions and Business Cycles” (OECD, 2000).
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Fig. 2. Stimulus data (T (—), G (- -)).
ﬁscal time series. For all countries, expectations started after the seventh year of the stimulus (which was 1977 for most
countries). A graph of the stimulus data for the different countries is shown in Fig. 2, with the basic statistics of the two series
(means, G¯ and T¯; standard deviations, T and G; and standard deviations of the rates of change, T and G).
In total, 170 subjects participated in the experiment. Each subject could participate only in one treatment: 76 took part
in the baseline Tt and Gt treatment, 69 in the neutral treatment, and 25 in the Tt only treatment.
Each participant made forecasts for a sequence of countries. Sequences were determined randomly and independently
for all participants. Table 1 summarises the number of participants playing the various countries in the three treatments.
The experiment was run at the experimental laboratory of the SFB 504 in Mannheim. Participants were students at the
university: 116were from economics or business (wewill call them economists), 38 frompolitical science, law and languages
(in the following we will call these students in other humanities), and 12 from natural sciences. 130 were male and 40 were
female. Sessionswere conducted individually and lasted for about 2h. Participantsmade, on average, 136 forecasts (between
28 and 309) and completed on average one forecast every 39 s.
Table 1
Countries played by participants across treatments.
Country Sample period Number of participants/country
Tt and Gt Tt only Neutral
Austria 1970–1998 34 14 28
Belgium 1970–1998 52 20 48
Denmark 1971–1995 43 14 43
Finland 1970–1998 33 12 24
France 1977–1998 29 10 31
Germany 1970–1998 14 13 5
Greece 1975–1998 26 13 22
Ireland 1970–1995 45 21 44
Italy 1970–1998 35 16 29
Netherlands 1970–1998 32 9 23
Norway 1970–1998 32 14 26
Portugal 1970–1998 25 13 23
Spain 1970–1998 30 11 24
Sweden 1970–1998 53 16 41
United Kingdom 1970–1995 27 15 19
Total 510 211 430
Since participants made forecasts for more than one country, the total number is not the sum of the number of participants in all countries.
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Fig. 3. Countries, learning and fatigue during the experiment. The left graph shows the cumulative frequency of the number of countries our participants
visit during the experiment; the middle and the right graph show quantiles for forecast errors during the experiment. Quantiles are taken over 10 bands
with the same number of observations. The horizontal axis show the total time in minutes since the start of the experiment.
Fig. 4. Distribution of decision time in seconds and quantiles of forecast errors over the decision time. Quantiles are taken over 10 bands with the same
number of observations.
3. Descriptive analysis of the evidence and internal validity
Laboratory experiments are often inspired by the real world and often use in their setup parameters that are based on
ﬁeld data. Using not only parameters, but datasets from the ﬁeld in the laboratory is novel and, we believe, innovative, but
poses various questions. A ﬁrst one is about the internal validity of the experimental setup.
3.1. Learning and fatigue
The longer an experiment lasts, the more time participants have to learn and to understand their task. However, during
a long experiment participants might have difﬁculties in concentrating; thus the quality of observations might eventually
decrease. Fig. 3 shows the development of absolute forecast errors over time. We see that forecast errors decrease over the
course of the experiment. The effect of learning seems to dominate fatigue all the time. Though the change over time is rather
small, the decreasing trend is signiﬁcant.6
3.2. Decision time
The left graph in Fig. 4 shows the cumulative frequency of time subjects take for individual decisions. The mean decision
time (over all decisions) is about 35 s for each forecast; themedian (over all participants) is 25 s.While risk loving participants
might have a preference to use the maximal forecast time of 2min, our participants seem to prefer to share their risk over
different forecasts. The two remaining graphs in Fig. 4 shows the relation between forecast errors and decision time. The
relationship is, if at all, weak.7 Harder decisions (characterised by their larger forecast errors) seem to take only slightlymore
time.
6 Comparing average errors (per participant) in the ﬁrst and second half of the experiment with a pairwise Wilcoxon test rejects no or an increasing
trend with a p-value of 0.0003 for T and 0.0015 for G. A linear robust model that allows for correlated errors within the same participant rejects with a
p-value <10−7.
7 Separating decision times at themedian and comparing average errors as in footnote 6 shows only an insigniﬁcant change. A linear robust model yields
a p-value of 0.098 for T and 0.077 for G.
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Fig. 5. Distribution of average individual forecast errors by characteristics of participants and by treatment.
3.3. Participants’ characteristics
The left part of Fig. 5 shows the cumulative distribution of median absolute forecasts errors |T− TE| and |G−GE| per
participant for male and female participants. The difference is small and not signiﬁcant.8 The centre part of Fig. 5 shows the
cumulative distribution ofmedian absolute forecasts errors per participant for different ﬁelds. Students fromnatural sciences
seem to make slightly better forecasts for G than the other students. However, these are only 12 out of 170 participants, and
the difference between the different ﬁelds is small and not signiﬁcant both for G and for T.9
3.4. Economic context
Tocheckwhetherparticipantsunderstand theﬁscal frame,wecompare theTt andGt treatmentwith theneutral treatment.
If participants understand and make use of the economic context, we should observe smaller forecast errors in the Tt and
Gt treatment than in the neutral treatment. The right diagram in Fig. 5 shows cumulative distributions of forecast errors
for these treatments. We see that, as expected, forecast errors are larger in the neutral treatment; adding economic context
contributes signiﬁcantly to the understanding of the experiment.10 We also see that a simpler task that requires forecasts
only for T makes forecasts more precise for this variable.
3.5. Summary regression
Figs. 3–5 should give a rough impression of the determinants of sizes of forecast errors. To control for characteristics of
participants better and the random allocation of countries to participants, Table 2 presents estimates from linear regressions
that explain the squared forecast error as a function of various dummies.Model 1 includes a dummy for the type of treatment
(neutral/economic context) and a dummy for the forecasted variables (T-only/T and G). Model 2 adds a dummy for gender
(female is the reference group) and two dummies for the subject of studies (economics is the reference group). Model 3,
ﬁnally, adds dummies for each country.
Only two effects are signiﬁcant. Bothwere already visible in Fig. 5. First, reducing the number of variables to forecast in the
Tt only treatment also reduces the error. Second, withholding information about the economic context increases the error.
The latter shows that participants understand the economic context of our experiment, at least when we present variables
with their economic meaning.
8 Comparing median absolute errors with a Wilcoxon rank sum test yields a p-value of 0.8024 for T and of 0.1235 for G. A t-test yields a p-value of 0.8583
for T and of 0.2841 for G. Using mean squared errors instead of medians does not change the result considerably.
9 Comparingmedian absolute errors with an F-test yields a p-value of 0.7549 for T and 0.3243 forG; a non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis test yields a p-value
of 0.997 for T and 0.3110 for G.
10 Comparing median absolute errors with a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test yields a p-value of 0.0000075 for T and 0.09715 for G. A t-test yields
a p-value of 0.00001 for T and 0.0488 for G.
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Table 2
Estimation of squared forecast errors.
(T− TE)2 (G−GE)2
Model 1 ˆˇ/(ˆ) Model 2 ˆˇ/(ˆ) Model 3 ˆˇ/(ˆ) Model 1 ˆˇ/(ˆ) Model 2 ˆˇ/(ˆ) Model 3 ˆˇ/(ˆ)
Neutral 0.560* (0.219) 0.604** (0.214) 0.561** (0.207) 1.071* (0.472) 1.360** (0.469) 1.054** (0.346)
Tt only treatment −0.651*** (0.134) −0.608*** (0.138) −0.498*** (0.121)
Male −0.080 (0.169) −0.055 (0.156) −0.950 (0.543) −0.377 (0.388)
Other humanities −0.175 (0.181) −0.094 (0.166) −0.251 (0.627) 0.129 (0.453)
Natural sciences 0.382 (0.480) 0.502 (0.458) −1.106 (0.693) 0.028 (0.591)
Country dummies Not shown Not shown
Constant 2.777*** (0.106) 2.906*** (0.325) 1.117*** (0.299) 6.369*** (0.311) 8.005*** (1.053) 2.151* (0.827)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses and are calculated using a robust regression which takes into account correlations of observations for each
participant. Similar results can be obtained also for median absolute errors.
* Denote signiﬁcance at 5% level.
** Denote signiﬁcance at 1% level.
*** Denote signiﬁcance at 0.1% level.
3.6. External signiﬁcance
Another important question about the experimental setup concerns its external signiﬁcance. Consumers in the ﬁeld
form expectations on ﬁscal policy not only on the basis of spending and taxes, but also through the composition of the
government, the date of the next election, economic development, foreign policy, and natural disasters, to name only a few.
In the experimental laboratory we are able to neglect all these factors and study T and G in isolation. Any systematic change
of expectations that we observe in the lab must be due to a change in T or G.
The choice of factors that we study here, T and G, is standard in the empirical literature which studies ﬁscal conduct of
countries. Below we refer to an important stream of literature that, since at least the mid-1980s, has used cointegration
techniques and the econometrics of Granger causality to study the dynamics of the public budget intertemporal constraint.11
In the next section we develop an empirical model of stimuli and of expectation data that coherently ties the present
experiment to such econometric practice. Through itwe discuss themeaning and implication of general expectation schemes
(rational, adaptive, augmented-adaptive), we consider and estimate properties of ﬁeld data, andwe check how these features
are perceived by subjects in the experiment.
4. An econometric analysis of the ﬁeld-lab data: expectations
In this section we want to study the model of expectation formation used by participants and the perceived relationships
among ﬁscal variables. We emphasize again that, unlike previous experiments of expectational models that are based on an
artiﬁcial data generating process, we are using here data from the ﬁeld. Using an artiﬁcial data generating process has the
advantage of providing a clear benchmark solution. A disadvantage is that it might be difﬁcult to explain such a process to
participants in an experiment. Another problem is that one observes forecasts for abstract time series when one wants to
describe forecasting behaviour for real time series. Using data from theﬁeldmaymake itmore likely that the forecasting rules
participants use in the experiment are close to the rules they would use otherwise with ﬁeld data. Using data from the ﬁeld
alsomeans thatwe lose the obvious benchmark solution.With time series that are based on a knownabstractmodel, itwould
be clear what rational expectations have to be, but what are rational expectations when we use real world data? We now no
longer know the benchmark solution; instead we have to estimate one. We acknowledge that this is far from perfect since
econometric techniquesused to ascertainproperties of real data are often less thanperfect. Our approach is basedon standard
techniques used since at least themid-1980s by economists and econometricians to study the dynamics of ﬁscal policies.We
assume that the data generation processes for both the ﬁeld and the lab can be taken to be a Vector Autoregressive Process
(VAR).We ﬁrst review the approach and adapt it to this experiment12; thenwe present the evidence based on its estimation.
4.1. The VAR model of the ﬁeld-lab data
4.1.1. The VAR for the ﬁeld data (stimuli)
The ﬁeld model concerns the stimuli data, that is the vector xt: = (Tt, Gt)′, treated for each country separately. A standard
VAR representation of the ﬁeld systems is given by
xt = x + ˛xˇ′1xxt−1 +
k−1∑
=1
,xxxt− + εxt. (3)
11 See Section 4.1 below for various references to the literature.
12 See for example Johansen (1995) for a modern treatment of the literature on VAR. See our technical report (Bernasconi et al., 2004) for a more detailed
exposition of how the ﬁeld and lab VARs can be consistently derived in the present experiment.
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The expression takes the stimuli data xt: = (Tt, Gt)′ as integrated of order 1, I(1); x is a vector of constants; ˇ′1xxt−1 is an error
correction term (cointegrating relation CI) expressing the long-run disequilibrium between taxes and expenditure in the
ﬁeld; ˛x = (˛T, ˛G)′ is the associated vector of the adjustment coefﬁcients;  ,xx are the matrices of the coefﬁcients of partial
adjustments; and εxt are error terms i.i.d. N(0, ˝xx).
Versions of this basic model have been analysed extensively in the literature (see, e.g. Trehan and Walsh, 1991; Ahmed
and Rogers, 1995). An issue considered is sustainability of ﬁscal policywhich can be checked byway of cointegration analysis
between taxes and public expenditure. In short, cointegration tests are based on the idea that solvency requires the budget
deﬁcit to be stationary. Even when Tt and Gt are non-stationary, there may be linear combinations of the form Tt +
Gt +
(where 
 and  are constants) which are stationary. In this case, Tt and Gt are said to be cointegrated of order 1, with
cointegrating vector (CI) (1,
). Stationarity of the budget then further requires 
 =−1 (homogeneity condition).
A second empirical issue analysed within Eq. (3) concerns the direction of causality between taxes and public
expenditure.13 In particular, when the series in xt: = (Tt, Gt)′ are cointegrated, at least one of Tt and Gt adjusts to disequi-
librium with respect to the long-run relation. Four cases may then emerge: that taxes cause spending, that spending causes
taxes, bidirectional causality, and lack of causality. These cases can be represented as a vector ˛x = (˛T, ˛G)′ of the forms (0,
*)′, (*, 0)′, (*, *)′ and (0, 0)′ (with * indicating a non-zero coefﬁcient), thus providing tests of Granger long-run causality.14
Short-run causality can be similarly checked by looking for signiﬁcant off-diagonal coefﬁcients in the matrices  ,xx.
4.1.2. The VAR for the lab data (expectations)
For the lab model, let m indicate the number of individuals, i=1, . . .,m, in a treatment. Recall that expectations yi,t =
(TEit , G
Ei
t )
′ in the Tt and Gt treatment and yi,t = TEit in the Tt only treatment. We now illustrate the model for yi,t = (TEit , GEit )′,
which is applied with the obvious modiﬁcations to the Tt only treatment.
For individual i the VAR has the following form:
(
TEit
GEit
)
= i + ˛i
⎛
⎜⎝
Tt−1 + 
ˆGt−1
TEit−1 − Tt−1
GEit−1 − Gt−1
⎞
⎟⎠+ k−1∑
=1
(,ii, ,ix)
(
yi,t−
xt−
)
+ εˆyt . (4)
Eq. (4) includes a vector of constant terms i = (iTE , iGE )′; a matrix (2×3) of adjustment coefﬁcients ˛i, decomposed
as ˛i: = (˛i1,˛i2), where ˛i1 = (˛iTE , ˛iGE )′ shows how the expectation variables may react to the disequilibrium vector esti-
mated in the ﬁeld, Tt−1 + 
ˆGt−1 (also labeled ECMTG); while vec(˛′i2)
′ = (˛iTE(TET), ˛iTE(GEG), ˛iGE(TET), ˛iGE(GEG)) includes the
responses to two further possible CI relations given by the errors in expectations (TEit−1 − Tt−1, GEit−1 − Gt−1)
′ (also called
(ECMTET,ECMGEG)
′);  ,ix captures causality from the ﬁeld to the lab, and  ,ii causality from past expectations to present
ones.
We should note that for participants who perceive the ﬁscal properties from the ﬁeld the lab system (4) collapses to the
speciﬁcation of the marginal ﬁeld system (3). We use the ﬁeld system (3) as one reference point and say that participants
whose expectations follow (3) have rational expectations. We will also investigate whether and how participants pick up the
actual cointegration by comparing ˛i1 = (˛iTE , ˛iGE )′ from the lab with ˛x = (˛T, ˛G)′ from the ﬁeld. Also of interest is the
inference on the vector of constant terms i, indicating subjects’ perception of trends in the data.
One alternative class of expectation formation processes is the adaptive scheme, as originated in the 1950s by the works
of different scholars (see Pesaran, 1987 for references). We emphasize the bivariate nature that can take here the adaptive
schemes. In particular, under univariate or purely adaptive expectations, past values of the forecasted variable x1t and of its
forecast y1
i,t
enter the expectationprocess for y1
i,t
, where a superscript 1 indicates one stimulus variable and the corresponding
forecast. If other variables enter in the estimated equation for y1
i,t
, this is evidence against a purely adaptive scheme and
in favour of a more general class of models known as augmented-adaptive (see again Pesaran, 1987 for the many variations
nested within this deﬁnition).15 In augmented-adaptive schemes one can also address questions of perceived causality
between taxes and public expenditure.16
The individual lab sub-systems (4)may be estimated one at the time or jointly. Joint estimation under some homogeneity
restrictions allows us to exploit the panel dimension of the data to increase efﬁciency. In the empirical analysis we will
ﬁrst estimate for each country a model of a representative-agent’s expectations. This model we will compare with the
corresponding country ﬁeld model. In this comparison we will focus on the expectations obtained from the experiment
conducted under the ﬁscal frame. Thenwewill compare results from different treatments, including experiments conducted
13 See Garcia and Henin (1999) and Payne (1998) for reviews and recent empirical evidence on this classical theme of public ﬁnance.
14 Lack of causality (i.e. ˛x = (0, 0)′) is incompatible with the presence of cointegration in (3) (see Johansen, 1995).
15 Inmost previous expectation experiments, subjects had to forecast univariate time series (as for example in Schmalensee, 1976 orHey, 1994) or reduced-
univariate schemes arising from augmented-adaptive forms (as in experiments of price expectations in classical cobweb economies, for example Hommes
et al., 2007 or on inﬂation expectations in overlapping generation economies; see Duffy, 1998 for a review). They generally found support for adaptive
expectations (though not necessarily of the ﬁrst order, see, e.g. Hey).
16 In particular, by inspection of the parameters in (4) one should note the following: the ˛i1 coefﬁcients and the off-diagonal elements in the  , ix
matrices determine the direction of causality from the ﬁeld to the lab, while the ˛i2 coefﬁcients and the off-diagonal elements in the  , ii matrices regulate
the ones from the past expectations on present expectations.
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Table 3
Cointegrating vectors estimated for stimulus data.
Country Cointegrating vector (ˇ′1x, ) Test of 
ˆ = −1 homogeneity condition
Austria (1, −0.739, −10.385) −13.23***
Finland (1, −0.565, −21.436) −28.29***
Germany (1, −0.572, −17.863) −4.32**
Italy (1, −0.892, 0) −1.72
Netherlands (1, −0.606, −17.630) −13.51***
Norway (1, −1.051, 0) −3.52**
Portugal (1, −1.177, 13.667) −2.09*
Sweden (1, −0.950, 0) −2.13*
UK (1, −0.922, 0) −9.18***
Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, and Spain are not shown in the table since they show no cointegration.
* Denote 10% signiﬁcance level.
** Denote 5% signiﬁcance level.
*** Denote 1% signiﬁcance level.
under the neutral frame.Wewill also reconsider the homogeneity condition andwewill present estimations at the individual
level.
4.2. Evidence
4.2.1. Comparison between the ﬁeld and the lab VARs
Table 3 reports the results of the cointegration analysis on the stimulus data.17 For 9 countries (Austria, Finland, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and UK), we ﬁnd that taxes and public expenditures are cointegrated; for 6
(Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, and Spain)weﬁnd that they are not. Among the former and consistentlywith the
evidence reported in the literature (see, e.g. Manasse, 1996), the condition for stationarity of the budget 
ˆ = −1 is rejected
for most countries. The estimated CI vectors have the form (ˇ′1x, ) with ˇ
′
1xxt = Tt + 
Gt and x=˛x·, which exclude linear
trends in the data (see Johansen, 1995). This feature of ﬁeld data is intuitive18 and indeed passed for all countries in the
sample. Below we will check how subjects reﬂect this feature of the real data in their expectations.
Table 4 summarises the main ﬁndings of the inference on both the ﬁeld and the lab systems in the two experimental
treatments under the ﬁscal frame. All parameters reported in the table are signiﬁcant at least at a 5% level.19 In considering
the results, recall that in the Tt only treatment, in which agents forecast taxes, expectations on GEit are not available.
The leftmost part of the table reports, for the ﬁeld and for the lab, the coefﬁcients of responses to the ﬁeld error correction
term ECMTG = Tt + 
ˆGt . Consider ﬁrst the ﬁeld evidence (the ﬁrst column in the table). Among the nine countries for which
cointegration between taxes and expenditure was found, expenditure is long-run adjusting to taxes in four cases (Austria,
Norway, Sweden and UK); taxes are adjusting to expenditure in four others (Finland, Germany, Italy and Netherlands); and
in one country (Portugal) adjustment is bidirectional.
Results from the experiments show that subjects do not follow the CI characteristics of the ﬁeld data. In both experimental
treatments the lab responses ˛i1 to ECMTG are often not signiﬁcantly different from zero, and even when they are, ˛i1 are in
any case quite small. On the contrary, the vectors of constants estimated in the lab show that, while subjects do not follow
the CI characteristics of the real-data, they perceive for most countries a linear trend which is not found by the ﬁeld VARs.
In the rightmost part of Table 4we show the results of tests on Granger causality in the ﬁeld and compare themwith tests
of perceived causality in the lab. Results speak strongly against subjects correctly perceiving the properties of ﬁeld stimuli
data. In the Tt and Gt treatment only in one case (Portugal) the causality matches the causality from the ﬁeld data; in the Tt
only treatment subjects perceive a good deal of causality from expenditure to taxes, but in many cases it is not consistent
with the causality in the ﬁeld.
4.2.2. Expectation schemes
The comparisons between the ﬁeld and the lab VARs clearly reject the hypothesis of subjects following rational expec-
tations. Looking at the middle part of Table 4 we ﬁnd instead support for adaptive expectations. Estimates of the vector
˛i2 describe how individuals react in the long-run to errors in their expectations (TEit−1 − Tt−1, GEit−1 − Gt−1)
′. In the Tt and Gt
treatment the coefﬁcients for ECMTET in the equation for TEit and the coefﬁcients on ECMG
EG in the equation for GEit are
17 We follow a standard procedure to test for cointegration in system (3). We start determining the lags order k of the ﬁeld VAR (which was two for most
countries) and then use the Johansen procedure to test for the rank r of the system (that is, the number of CI vectors). We use the LR trace test for H0: r=0
versus H1: r=1 and exclude the case of a stationary system r=2, where both taxes and expenditure are stationary in levels.
18 Since xt contains the ratio of taxes and expenditure to total GDP, we expect the system xt: = (Tt , Gt)′ not to contain a linear trend.
19 Detailed parameter estimates, together with standard errors and level of statistical signiﬁcance, are available in Bernasconi et al. (2004). All models
presented here have been selected performing a computerised strategy, which started to drop coefﬁcients with higher p-values. We have checked that the
selected models are robust to alternative procedures.
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Table 4
Summary of inference results.
Vectors of responses to ECMTG : Tt + 
ˆGt Vectors of lab constants
i = (iTE : iGE )
Vectors of responses to
(ECETET, ECEGEG)
′ : (TEit − Tt, GEit − Gt )
′
Direction of short-run causality
inferred from  ,xx and  ,ix
Field ˛′x Tt and Gt
treatment ˛′
i1
Tt only
treatment ˛′
i1
Tt and Gt
treatment ′
i
Tt only
treatment ′
i
Tt and treatment ˛i2 Tt only
treatment ˛i2
Field Tt and Gt
treatment
Tt only
treatment
Austria (0, 1.308) (0, 0) (0, *) (0.264, 0.146) (0.155, *) ((−0.921, 0), (0.084, −0.695)) ((−0.863, *), *) T↔G T←G
Belgium (0.285, 0.138) (0.160, *) ((−0.838, 0), (0, −0.656)) ((−0.810, *), *) T←G T↔G T←G
Denmark (0.273, 0.172) (0, *) ((−0.885, 0.138), (0.096, −0.622)) ((−0.872, *), *) T↔G T←G
Finland (−0.953, 0) (−0.145, 0) (−0.164, *) (0, 0) (0, *) ((−0.923, 0.171), (0, −0.512)) ((−0.825, *), *) T←G T↔G T←G
France (0.175, 0) (0, *) ((−0.709, −0.124) (0, −0.849)) ((−0.655, *), *) T←G T↔G T←G
Germany (−1.007, 0) (0, 0) (0.165, *) (0.199, 0.329) (0.110, *) ((−0.842, 0), (0, −0.695)) ((−0.961, *), *) T→G T←G
Greece (0.606, 0.199) (0.581, *) ((−0.915, 0), (0, −0.717)) ((−1.058, *), *) T←G T←G
Ireland (0.435, 0.561) (0.322, *) ((−0.739, 0), (−0.141, −0.799)) ((−0.676, *), *) T→G T←G
Italy (−0.155, 0) (−0.072,
−0.084)
(−0.034, *) (0, 0) (0, *) ((−0.771, 0.074), (0, −0.744)) ((−0.864, *), *) T→G
Netherlands (−0.623, 0) (0, 0) (0, *) (0.280, 0.301) (0.324, *) ((−0.736, 0), (0, −0.800)) ((−0.809, *), *) T←G T←G
Norway (0, 0.308) (0, 0.083) (0, *) (0, 0.314) (0, *) ((−0.732, 0), (0.166, −0.751)) ((−0.731, *), *) T→G T→G T←G
Portugal (0.290, 0.670) (0, 0.175) (0, *) (0.711, 0) (0.175, *) ((−0.744, 0), (0.240, −0.633)) ((−0.758, *), *) T↔G T↔G T←G
Spain (0.276, 0.141) (0.202, *) ((−0.732, 0), (0, −0.657)) ((−0.548, *), *) T→G T←G
Sweden (0, 0.280) (−0.034,
0.086)
(0, *) (0.239, 0.138) (0.112, *) ((−0.692, 0), (0.111, −0.743)) ((−0.670, *), *) T→G T←G T←G
United-Kingdom (0, 0.435) (0, 0) (0, *) (0.249, 0.176) (0.172, *) ((−0.883, 0), (0.175, −0.780)) ((−0.675, *), *) T→G T←G
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Fig. 6. Results of estimating Eq. (4) for each individual. Graphs show the distribution of the estimated coefﬁcients of Eq. (4). We impose the restriction that
each individual uses the same model for all countries.
positive and close to 1. The same holds in the Tt only treatment for the coefﬁcients for ECMTET in the equation for TEit . In
both experimental treatments the estimated parameters are typically less than 1. (This is also conﬁrmed by formal t-tests
conducted on the parameters.) Conversely, in the Tt and Gt treatment, the off-diagonal diagonal of ˛i2 are in most cases
equal to or very close to zero. In other words, subjects do not adjust expectations for taxes to errors in the expectations on
expenditure, and vice versa.
To obtain further evidence on the process subjects use to form expectations, we estimate Eq. (4) separately for each
individual.20 Fig. 6 presents distributions of the coefﬁcients for the two ﬁscal treatments as well as for the neutral treatment.
Results conﬁrm what we learned from the aggregate model. Coefﬁcients of responses to the ﬁeld error correction term
ECMTG are zero or close to zero for all treatments and for both equations. Positive liner trends (i) in the data are perceived
by several participants. The coefﬁcients of matrices  ,ix summed over lags show that, in both equations, the diagonal
coefﬁcients (hence the own-effects of Tt− on TEit and of Gt− on G
Ei
t ) are larger than the off-diagonal terms, but
the latter do not necessarily vanish. The coefﬁcients for  ,ii, summed-up over lags, refer to the short-run effects of past
expectations on present expectations and show a moderate tendency of subjects to smooth out peaks in past expectations.
The distributions of the adjustment coefﬁcients to the error terms (ECMTET, ECMGEG)′ conﬁrm that in all treatments subjects
adjust to past forecast errors.
As a whole, we take the above results to support the hypothesis of subjects following adaptive expectations, but not quite
a purely univariate model. While the results suggest that participants assume some interaction between ﬁscal variables, we
can conclude from Table 4 that this interaction changes over countries.21 We take this to be evidence in favor of models of
augmented-adaptive expectations.
In Section 3 we have compared different treatment frames. In our baseline frame the variables shown on the screen
have their original economic labels. In the alternative ‘neutral’ frame these labels are just letters from A to D. We suspected
that forecasts in the ‘neutral’ frame are less precise and, indeed, conﬁrmed this hypothesis in Fig. 5 and in Table 2. In the
same section we compared different participant groups. Several of our participants are students in economics or business
administration. We found, however, that forecasts of these participants are not better than those of other participants.
Can one use the estimates of Eq. (4) in order to learnmore aboutwhy economic labels help participants tomake forecasts?
If participants from economics are not systematically better in their forecasts, are they at least systematically different?
Unfortunately, the answer to both questions is No.
20 To select the model we use the same procedure as in the aggregate model (footnote 19).
21 This can be conﬁrmed be estimating Eq. (4) separately for individuals and countries.
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Table 5
Impact of treatment frame and participants on Eq. (4).
Data comparison
dep. var. coefﬁcient
Tt and Gt treatment frame: neutral↔ economic labels Tt and Gt treatment and economics↔other ﬁelds
TE GE TE GE
Econ Neutral p Econ Neutral p Other Econ p Other Econ p
ECMTG −0.021 −0.008 0.543 0.026 0.052 0.390 −0.021 −0.021 1.00 0.030 0.025 0.879
i 0.268 0.199 0.109 0.170 0.271 0.136 0.274 0.266 0.888 0.198 0.159 0.642
T:  ,ix 0.395 0.442 0.478 0.082 0.077 0.961 0.500 0.350 0.068 0.144 0.055 0.324
G:  ,ix 0.069 0.036 0.315 0.425 0.306 0.114 0.057 0.074 0.630 0.582 0.357 0.013
T:  ,ii −0.049 −0.002 0.149 −0.063 −0.091 0.561 −0.076 −0.037 0.375 −0.095 −0.050 0.335
G:  ,ii −0.009 0.008 0.352 0.018 0.062 0.226 −0.008 −0.009 0.987 −0.044 0.045 0.052
T: ECM.E. −0.881 −0.918 0.437 0.038 0.062 0.623 −0.805 −0.914 0.098 0.101 0.010 0.083
G: ECM.E. 0.016 −0.005 0.319 −0.910 −1.021 0.035 0.028 0.011 0.504 −0.813 −0.953 0.057
The table reports average estimated coefﬁcients of Eq. (4). The left part compares the neutral and the economic frame. The right part compares the average
coefﬁcients for participants with a background in economics with those from other disciplines. Next to the two means (for ‘other’ and ‘econ’) the table
reports a p-value for a Welch two sample t-test.
Table 5 compares average coefﬁcients of Eq. (4) for the treatmentwithneutral and economic labels and for the participants
with different backgrounds. Most differences between coefﬁcients are not signiﬁcant.
5. Conclusions
Experimental economics has grown substantially over the last two or three decades, as it is now a well-acknowledged
method through which decision theorists, game theorists and microeconomists have tested and reﬁned theoretical models
in their respective ﬁelds of interest.
Relatively few experiments have been conducted in the ﬁeld of macroeconomics. The reason, probably, is that macroe-
conomists, dealing with real world questions to a much greater degree than other economists, are convicted that laboratory
experiments cannot really answer such type of questions. The approach pursued in this paper follows the idea that using
real world data as stimuli for subjects in the experiments might be a step in understanding which variables and forces are
more relevant when individuals take actions of macroeconomic relevance.
We propose our experiment as an alternative to experiments that are based on entirely artiﬁcial time series or time
series whose parameters are based on ﬁeld data. In our experiment participants receive as stimuli real world data on ﬁscal
variables and form expectations on the basis of that information. Such an extension has advantages as well as disadvantages.
Constructing a rational reference point is harder than with artiﬁcial time series. However, we have seen in our experiment
that using economically meaningful data is important as it affects expectations of participants in our experiment.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.002.
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